“New concepts for quantum computer implementations, algorithms, and advances in the theoretical understanding of the physics requirements for quantum computers appear almost weekly in the scientific literature.”

ARDA, Report of the Quantum Information Science and Technology Experts Panel

"Even a relatively small quantum computer, one that had a few tens of thousands of qubits, could consider so many different values at once that it would be able to break all known [ed: RSA, D&H, ECC, AES-128] codes commonly used for secure Internet communication.”

Prof Seth Lloyd of MIT, MIT Review 2008

"But conventional security is not enough. The complexity of today's operational environment means organisations must embrace a level of business resilience that is normally associated with the protection of critical national infrastructure."

Detica, a BAE Systems Company

"One often hears recommendations for key-sizes of public-key cryptosystems needed to obtain security for 30 years and even 50 years. Anyone wanting a real security of this magnitude should probably take the construction of the quantum computer into consideration."

ECRYPT, “D.PROVI.3 – First Summary Report on Unconditionally Secure Protocols”, January 2005

"Given their power to intercept and disrupt secret communications, it is not surprising that quantum computers have the attention of various U.S. government agencies.  The National Security Agency, which supports research in quantum computing, candidly declares that given its interest in keeping U.S. government communications secure, it is loath to see quantum computers built. On the other hand, if they can be built, then it wants to have the first one.”

Prof Seth Lloyd of MIT, MIT Review 2008

"The security of the digital world has become a fundamental stake for the citizen with respect to his individual freedom ..., for the company with respect to the protection of its computerized industrial assets, ..., and for the state with respect to the reliability of operations and the reduction in the vulnerability of large and critical infrastructures ...”

“Given today’s common hardware and software architectural paradigms, operating systems security is a major primitive for secure systems – you will not succeed without it. This area is so important that it needs all the emphasis it can get. It is the current ‘black hole’ of security.”

Brian Snow, Former Technical Director of the US National Security Agency (NSA), "We need assurance!", 1999-2008

Florence Luy asks the question: "Is the writing on the wall for 1024-bit (RSA) encryption?"
Dutch mathematician Hendrik Willem Lenstra: "The answer to that question is an unqualified yes."

Florence Luy, Hendrik Lenstra, “A mighty number falls”, 21 May 2007, École Polytechnicque Fédérale de Lausanne

“Never underestimate the attention, risk, money and time that an opponent will put into reading traffic.”

Robert Morris, former Chief Scientist of the US National Security Agency (NSA), National Computer Security Center, "Crypto '95 invited talks by R. Morris and A. Shamir", 1995

“The rapidly evolving field of quantum computers is one of the most active research areas of modern science, attracting substantial funding that supports research groups at internationally leading academic institutions, national laboratories, and major industrial-research centers.”

ARDA, Report of the Quantum Information Science and Technology Experts Panel, 2004

"Many crypto-systems considered robust have been broken after a certain amount of time (between 10-20 years).  ... We need to build crypto-systems that offer long term security, for example for protecting financial and medical information (medical information such as our DNA may be sensitive information with impact on our children, our grandchildren and beyond)."

Public key crypto key exchanges (RSA, D&H, ECC) would be ‘flat-lined’ under a quantum computer attack … "Open Problem”

Brian Snow, Former Technical Director of the US National Security Agency (NSA), Public Key Cryptography 30th Anniversary Conference, Dec 2006

"There is a good chance that large quantum computers can be built within the next 20 years.  This would be a nightmare for IT security if there are no fully developed, implemented, and standardized post-quantum signature schemes."

Prof. Johannes Buchmann, et al, “Post-Quantum Signatures”, Oct 2004, Technische Universität Darmstadt

“When will we be secure? Nobody knows for sure – but it cannot happen before commercial security products and services possess not only enough functionality to satisfy customers’ stated needs, but also sufficient assurance of quality, reliability, safety, and appropriateness for use. Such assurances are lacking in most of today’s commercial security products and services.”

Brian Snow, Former Technical Director of the US National Security Agency (NSA), "We need Assurance", 2005

"My colleagues at MIT and I have been building simple quantum computers and executing quantum algorithms since 1996, as have other scientists around the world. Quantum computers work as promised. If they can be scaled up, to thousands or tens of thousands of qubits from their current size of a dozen or so, watch out!”

Prof Seth Lloyd of MIT, MIT Review 2008

“Assurance is best addressed during the initial design and engineering of security systems, NOT as an after market patch. The earlier you include a security architect in your design process, the greater the likely hood of a successful and robust design. As the quip goes, he who gets to the (module) interface first wins.”

Brian Snow, Former Technical Director of the US National Security Agency (NSA), "We need Assurance", AusCERT 2008

"Unfortunately, the security issues of a technology near the end of its lifetime are typically overlooked.  The best known example is that of cryptographic keys and algorithms which may need to offer in some cases security for 50 to 100 years."