• “The time needed to factor an RSA integer is the same order as the time needed to use that same integer as modulus for a single RSA encryption.   In other words, it takes no more time to break RSA on a quantum computer (up to a multiplicative constant) than to use it legitimately on a classical computer.”

    Professor Gilles Brassard,  "Quantum Information Processing: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly", 1997

    Read more...

  • "One should not assume that stakeholders do not care about their security merely because they do not understand the consequences of certain actions. The perception of risk can vary significantly from actual risk and, in the short term, convenience may lead some early adopters to make hazardous decisions."

    SecurIST, “D3.3 – ICT Security & Dependability Research beyond 2010: Final Strategy”, January 2007
    Read more...
  • "First and foremost, there is no proper excuse for continued use of a broken cryptographic primitive (MD5) when sufficiently strong alternatives are readily available, for example SHA-2. Secondly, there is no substitute for security awareness." ... "Advice from experts should be taken seriously and early in the process. In this case, MD5 should have been phased out soon after 2004."

    Alexander Sotirov, Marc Stevens, Jacob Appelbaum, Arjen Lenstra, David Molnar, Dag Arne Osvik, Benne de Wegerr, "MD5 considered harmful today - Creating a rogue CA certificate", December 2008
    Read more...
bibliography: Post-Quantum Signatures (2004)(TUD)
Security bibliography - Digital Signatures - candidate post quantum secure
Authors: Johannes Buchmann, Carlos Coronado, Martin Döring, Daniela Engelbert, Christoph Ludwig, Raphael Overbeck, Arthur Schmidt, Ulrich Vollmer, Ralf-Philipp Weinmann
Organisation: Technische Universität Darmstadt (TUD)
Date: April, 2004
Keywords: asymmetric cryptography, digital signatures, quantum computers
Electronic Publication: http://eprint.iacr.org/2004/297.pdf
Abstract: Digital signatures have become a key technology for making the Internet and other IT infrastructures secure. But in 1994 Peter Shor showed that quantum computers can break all digital signature schemes that are used today and in 2001 Chuang and his coworkers implemented Shor’s algorithm for the first time on a 7-qubit NMR quantum computer. This paper studies the question: What kind of digital signature algorithms are still secure in the age of quantum computers?
Quote: “There is a good chance that large quantum computers can be built within the next 20 years.  This would be a nightmare for IT security if there are no fully developed, implemented, and standardized post-quantum signature schemes.”
See:
Citation: Johannes Buchmann, Carlos Coronado, Martin Döring, Daniela Engelbert, Christoph Ludwig, Raphael Overbeck, Arthur Schmidt, Ulrich Vollmer, Ralf-Philipp Weinmann, “Post-Quantum Signatures”, October 29, 2004.
Related work:

Last Updated on Sunday, 04 January 2009 10:53
 

Related Items