• “The time needed to factor an RSA integer is the same order as the time needed to use that same integer as modulus for a single RSA encryption.   In other words, it takes no more time to break RSA on a quantum computer (up to a multiplicative constant) than to use it legitimately on a classical computer.”

    Professor Gilles Brassard,  "Quantum Information Processing: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly", 1997

  • "Some physicists predicted that within the next 10 to 20 years quantum computers will be built that are sufficiently powerful to implement Shor’s ideas and to break all existing public key schemes. Thus we need to look ahead to a future of quantum computers, and we need to prepare the cryptographic world for that future.”

    Prof Seth Lloyd of MIT, MIT Review 2008

  • “It's not good enough to have a system where everyone (using the system) must be trusted, it must also be made robust against insiders!”

    Robert Morris, former Chief Scientist of the US National Security Agency (NSA), National Computer Security Center, "Crypto '95 invited talks by R. Morris and A. Shamir", 1995

  • “We are a cyber nation. The U.S. information infrastructure--including telecommunications and computer networks and systems and the data that reside on them--is critical to virtually every aspect of modern life. This information infrastructure is increasingly vulnerable to exploitation, disruption, and destruction by a growing array of adversaries.”

    The National Coordination Office (NCO) for Networking Information Technology Research and Development (NITRD), Federal Register: December 30, 2008 (Volume 73, Number 250).

  • "First and foremost, there is no proper excuse for continued use of a broken cryptographic primitive (MD5) when sufficiently strong alternatives are readily available, for example SHA-2. Secondly, there is no substitute for security awareness." ... "Advice from experts should be taken seriously and early in the process. In this case, MD5 should have been phased out soon after 2004."

    Alexander Sotirov, Marc Stevens, Jacob Appelbaum, Arjen Lenstra, David Molnar, Dag Arne Osvik, Benne de Wegerr, "MD5 considered harmful today - Creating a rogue CA certificate", December 2008

  • “When will we be secure? Nobody knows for sure – but it cannot happen before commercial security products and services possess not only enough functionality to satisfy customers’ stated needs, but also sufficient assurance of quality, reliability, safety, and appropriateness for use. Such assurances are lacking in most of today’s commercial security products and services.”

    Brian Snow, Former Technical Director of the US National Security Agency (NSA), "We need Assurance", 2005

  • "History has taught us: never underestimate the amount of money, time, and effort someone will expend to thwart a security system. It's always better to assume the worst. Assume your adversaries are better than they are. Assume science and technology will soon be able to do things they cannot yet. Give yourself a margin for error. Give yourself more security than you need today. When the unexpected happens, you'll be glad you did."

    Bruce Schneier, "Why Cryptography Is Harder Than It Looks", 1997

  • “In the next five years we will counter many 'hacker' attacks but we will not be safe from Nation States and other large entities”

    Brian Snow, Former Technical Director of the US National Security Agency (NSA), "We need assurance!", 1999-2008

  • “Build-in Security: Ensure that security is considered and built into the design of new infrastructure, so that our critical assets are protected from the start and more resilient to naturally-occurring and deliberate threats throughout their life-cycle."

    Obama-Biden Plan, Agenda: Homeland Security, December 2008

  • “Never underestimate the attention, risk, money and time that an opponent will put into reading traffic.”

    Robert Morris, former Chief Scientist of the US National Security Agency (NSA), National Computer Security Center, "Crypto '95 invited talks by R. Morris and A. Shamir", 1995

  • “Given today’s common hardware and software architectural paradigms, operating systems security is a major primitive for secure systems – you will not succeed without it. This area is so important that it needs all the emphasis it can get. It is the current ‘black hole’ of security.”

    Brian Snow, Former Technical Director of the US National Security Agency (NSA), "We need assurance!", 1999-2008

  • "The future ability of quantum computers might be a decade or two away, their future ability to break public-key cryptography has important implications for the encryption of highly sensitive information today. For these applications, we must already design new public-key cryptosystems and one-way functions that are immune to quantum cryptanalysis."

    ARDA, Report of the Quantum Information Science and Technology Experts Panel, 2004

  • "My colleagues at MIT and I have been building simple quantum computers and executing quantum algorithms since 1996, as have other scientists around the world. Quantum computers work as promised. If they can be scaled up, to thousands or tens of thousands of qubits from their current size of a dozen or so, watch out!”

    Prof Seth Lloyd of MIT, MIT Review 2008

  • "Given their power to intercept and disrupt secret communications, it is not surprising that quantum computers have the attention of various U.S. government agencies.  The National Security Agency, which supports research in quantum computing, candidly declares that given its interest in keeping U.S. government communications secure, it is loath to see quantum computers built. On the other hand, if they can be built, then it wants to have the first one.”

    Prof Seth Lloyd of MIT, MIT Review 2008

  • “The software security industry today is at about the same stage as the auto industry was in 1930" ... "it looks fast, goes nice but in an accident you die.” ... "The major shortfall is absence of assurance (or safety) mechanisms in software. If my car crashed as often as my computer does, I would be dead by now."

    Brian Snow, Former Technical Director of the US National Security Agency (NSA), "We need assurance!", 1999-2008

Resources Hardware bibliography Quantum computers bibliography: ARDA Quantum Computation Report
bibliography: ARDA Quantum Computation Report
Authors: Richard Hughes, Gary Doolen, David Awschalom, Carlton Caves, Michael Chapman, Robert Clark, David Cory, David DiVincenzo, Artur Ekert, P. Chris Hammel, Paul Kwiat, Seth Lloyd, Gerard Milburn, Terry Orlando, Duncan Steel, Umesh Vazirani, Birgitta Whaley, David Wineland
Organisation: United States Advanced Research and Development Activity (ARDA)
Date: April, 2004
Keywords: asymmetric cryptography, quantum computers
Electronic Publication: http://qist.lanl.gov/ (Quantum Information Science and Technology Roadmapping Project)
http://qist.lanl.gov/pdfs/qc_roadmap.pdf (report)
Notes: The ARDA reports lists 155 known quantum computing research projects operating in 2004. NMR (9), 
ion trap (11), 
neutral atom (24), 
cavity QED (13), optical (21), 
solid state (32), 
superconducting (38), 
unique qubits (7).  It is anticipated that there are more quantum computing research projects today.
Quote: "The future ability of quantum computers might be a decade or two away, their future ability to break public-key cryptography has important implications for the encryption of highly sensitive information today. For these applications, we must already design new public-key cryptosystems and one-way functions that are immune to quantum cryptanalysis."
Quote:

“Another important issue is understanding whether the limits on quantum computing provide an opportunity to reconstitute modern cryptography despite Shor’s assault on the two most important one-way functions—factoring and discrete log.  Are there one-way functions that cannot be efficiently inverted even by a quantum algorithm?  The complexity theoretic basis for an affirmative answer was given by Bennett, et al., by showing that quantum computers require exponential time to invert a random permutation in the query model.  More recently, it was shown by Aaronson that quantum computers require exponential time to solve the collision problem in the query model, thus opening the possibility of collision-intractable hash functions that are secure against quantum cryptanalysis.” - In simple words build cryptographic systems using only block ciphers like AES, stream ciphers and collision resistant hash functions like SHA. This is the technique used by all Synaptic technologies.

Quote: "The search for new quantum algorithms is one of the biggest challenges in quantum computation today. Although factoring and discrete logarithms provide the killer applications for quantum computation today, once we have quantum computers, cryptography will no longer rely on these problems—therefore greatly reducing the practical value of these algorithms. The exploration of quantum algorithms is therefore of fundamental importance. In the years since Shor’s algorithms, the framework of the hidden subgroup problem (HSP) has been developed, and the holy grail of quantum algorithms has been clearly identified as the HSP for non-abelian groups. Two especially important cases are the dihedral group, which corresponds to the shortest lattice vector problem, and the symmetric group, which corresponds to graph isomorphism and graph automorphism, are important in their own right."
Quote: "Other computational problems that are potential targets for quantum algorithms are the nonsolvable group membership, the McEliese cryptosystem, and the learning AC0 circuits."
Quote: "Although QC is a basic-science endeavor today, it is realistic to predict that within a decade fault-tolerant QC could be achieved on a small scale."
See:
Citation: Richard Hughes, Gary Doolen, David Awschalom, Carlton Caves, Michael Chapman, Robert Clark, David Cory, David DiVincenzo, Artur Ekert, P. Chris Hammel, Paul Kwiat, Seth Lloyd, Gerard Milburn, Terry Orlando, Duncan Steel, Umesh Vazirani, Birgitta Whaley, David Wineland,  "A Quantum Information Science and Technology Roadmap, Part 1: Quantum Computation", Report of the Quantum Information Science and Technology Experts Panel, Version 2.0, April 2, 2004, Advanced Research and Development Activity
Related work:

 
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image Introduction to synaptic Laboratories global cyber safety and Security status 2012 Cyber Security Technical Problems, Drivers and Incentives Video Presentation by Brian Snow

"Synaptic Laboratories is a rare company; they tackle the hard problems! Their basic approach is directly relevant to Governments and/or any commercial companies that deploy products that must function correctly in high-risk environments. They differ from most competitors in that not only do they work hard to get the concepts right, they also work very hard to assure the implementation is correct and robust as well."

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