• “It's not good enough to have a system where everyone (using the system) must be trusted, it must also be made robust against insiders!”

    Robert Morris, former Chief Scientist of the US National Security Agency (NSA), National Computer Security Center, "Crypto '95 invited talks by R. Morris and A. Shamir", 1995

  • In the next five years we will counter many 'hacker' attacks but we will not be safe from Nation States and other large entities

    Brian Snow, Former Technical Director of the US National Security Agency (NSA), "We need assurance!", 1999-2008

  • “Given today’s common hardware and software architectural paradigms, operating systems security is a major primitive for secure systems – you will not succeed without it. This area is so important that it needs all the emphasis it can get. It is the current ‘black hole’ of security.”

    Brian Snow, Former Technical Director of the US National Security Agency (NSA), "We need assurance!", 1999-2008

  • "Given their power to intercept and disrupt secret communications, it is not surprising that quantum computers have the attention of various U.S. government agencies.  The National Security Agency, which supports research in quantum computing, candidly declares that given its interest in keeping U.S. government communications secure, it is loath to see quantum computers built. On the other hand, if they can be built, then it wants to have the first one.”

    Prof Seth Lloyd of MIT, MIT Review 2008

  • “The time needed to factor an RSA integer is the same order as the time needed to use that same integer as modulus for a single RSA encryption.   In other words, it takes no more time to break RSA on a quantum computer (up to a multiplicative constant) than to use it legitimately on a classical computer.”

    Professor Gilles Brassard,  "Quantum Information Processing: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly", 1997

  • "There is a good chance that large quantum computers can be built within the next 20 years.  This would be a nightmare for IT security if there are no fully developed, implemented, and standardized post-quantum signature schemes."

    Prof. Johannes Buchmann, et al, “Post-Quantum Signatures”, Oct 2004, Technische Universität Darmstadt

  • "Some physicists predicted that within the next 10 to 20 years quantum computers will be built that are sufficiently powerful to implement Shor’s ideas and to break all existing public key schemes. Thus we need to look ahead to a future of quantum computers, and we need to prepare the cryptographic world for that future.

    Prof Seth Lloyd of MIT, MIT Review 2008

  • "History has taught us: never underestimate the amount of money, time, and effort someone will expend to thwart a security system. It's always better to assume the worst. Assume your adversaries are better than they are. Assume science and technology will soon be able to do things they cannot yet. Give yourself a margin for error. Give yourself more security than you need today. When the unexpected happens, you'll be glad you did."

    Bruce Schneier, "Why Cryptography Is Harder Than It Looks", 1997
  • “Never underestimate the attention, risk, money and time that an opponent will put into reading traffic.”

    Robert Morris, former Chief Scientist of the US National Security Agency (NSA), National Computer Security Center, "Crypto '95 invited talks by R. Morris and A. Shamir", 1995

  • “Consider the use of smart cards ... for especially critical functions.  Although more costly than software, when properly implemented the assurance gain is great.  The form-factor is not as important as the existence of an isolated processor and address space for assured operations – an ‘Island of Security,’ if you will.  Such devices can communicate with each other through secure protocols and provide a web of security connecting secure nodes located across a sea of insecurity in the global net.”

    Brian Snow, Former Technical Director of the US National Security Agency (NSA), "We need assurance!", 1999-2008

  • Build-in Security: Ensure that security is considered and built into the design of new infrastructure, so that our critical assets are protected from the start and more resilient to naturally-occurring and deliberate threats throughout their life-cycle."

    Obama-Biden Plan, Agenda: Homeland Security, December 2008

Resources Frequently asked questions Security in general faq: How long will it take global systems to migrate to post quantum secure status?
faq: How long will it take global systems to migrate to post quantum secure status?
Synaptic Facts and FAQs - Security in general


The answer to this question depends on many factors including the complexity of the protocol, the number of computers that are in the system, the number of users in the system, the number of network attached devices in the system, where the network attached devices are physically deployed, who owns the networked attached devices, the potential losses from down time during upgrade, the risks of internal security failure during an upgrade, and so on.

At one extreme small groups of individuals or computers may be able to rapidly achieve a higher level of security using systems based around the Synaptic Group Key Exchange or Enterprise Key Exchange technologies. Synaptic is planning the deployment of a instant messaging system that should enable basic communications (voice, file transfer, etc) to be established rapidly between small groups.

At the other extreme the communications protocols between devices, readers, and back-office servers may need to be significantly revised to achieve the necessary level of security in a manner that is cost-effective over the life-cycle of the system.  For example, EMVco is considering making a protocol change to the Eurocard-MasterCard-Visa banking system.  EMVco advises that "it will take 12 to 15 years for the infrastructure to be migrated in support of the new technique, which is why we are now conducting a review of various options.".  Synaptic Labs' security ecosystem is designed explicitly to address secure RFID credit and debit card transactions in a way that can be cost effectively deployed on current smart cards, achieves 100 year security and maintains the privacy of card holders from third parties.

An example of upgrading a large number of devices in the field is the $1.5 billion Cryptographic Modernization Initiative in the US Department of Defense. This project aims to strengthen security by deploying ECC, a public key technology that is not post quantum secure, in only 1.3 million existing pieces of equipment over the next 10 years.

Business now relies on information infrastructures that are interlinked and interdependent. We need to understand how to predict and mitigate these risks with a view to aid reaction and recovery within these infrastructures.
...
Complex systems exist in all aspects of society ranging from stock market analysis to climate change, and information systems and infrastructures are no exception. As an information system matures it typically converges with others to add a richer functionality. This reliance upon extrinsic factors to deliver a service adds extra layers of complexity and interdependency, which are not fully understood and are to some degree uncontrollable.

The way in which these hidden interdependencies pervade our everyday lives is staggering and, in some cases, may go unchecked for many years until an incident occurs that revels the true nature of the interdependences' impact.

It is currently unclear how long it would take to upgrade all mission-critical national and international infrastructure to support a post quantum secure status. Synaptic Laboratories is working towards a cost effective way of achieving the necessary level of information assurance for our communications infrastructure while simultaneously increasing network performance in the Janelda communications project.

 
This website uses cookies to manage authentication, navigation, and to provide you with a better and more personal service. By continuing to use this website, you are consenting to this use. Find out more here.

image Introduction to synaptic Laboratories global cyber safety and Security status 2012 Cyber Security Technical Problems, Drivers and Incentives Video Presentation by Brian Snow

"Synaptic Laboratories is a rare company; they tackle the hard problems! Their basic approach is directly relevant to Governments and/or any commercial companies that deploy products that must function correctly in high-risk environments. They differ from most competitors in that not only do they work hard to get the concepts right, they also work very hard to assure the implementation is correct and robust as well."

Related Items