• "Even a relatively small quantum computer, one that had a few tens of thousands of qubits, could consider so many different values at once that it would be able to break all known [ed: RSA, D&H, ECC, AES-128] codes commonly used for secure Internet communication.”

    Prof Seth Lloyd of MIT, MIT Review 2008

  • “The current way which organisations approach security can be recognised as an underlying market failure which consists of fire fighting security problems, silo'd implementation of technologies, uncontrolled application development practices and a failure to address systemic problems. Organisations tend to deal with one problem at a time that results in the deployment of point solutions to treat singular problems. This failure is typical of an uncontrolled marketplace evolving with little or no co-ordination.

    The British Government’s Technology Strategy Board, 2008
  • “It's not good enough to have a system where everyone (using the system) must be trusted, it must also be made robust against insiders!”

    Robert Morris, former Chief Scientist of the US National Security Agency (NSA), National Computer Security Center, "Crypto '95 invited talks by R. Morris and A. Shamir", 1995

  • "First and foremost, there is no proper excuse for continued use of a broken cryptographic primitive (MD5) when sufficiently strong alternatives are readily available, for example SHA-2. Secondly, there is no substitute for security awareness." ... "Advice from experts should be taken seriously and early in the process. In this case, MD5 should have been phased out soon after 2004."

    Alexander Sotirov, Marc Stevens, Jacob Appelbaum, Arjen Lenstra, David Molnar, Dag Arne Osvik, Benne de Wegerr, "MD5 considered harmful today - Creating a rogue CA certificate", December 2008
  • “Consider the use of smart cards ... for especially critical functions.  Although more costly than software, when properly implemented the assurance gain is great.  The form-factor is not as important as the existence of an isolated processor and address space for assured operations – an ‘Island of Security,’ if you will.  Such devices can communicate with each other through secure protocols and provide a web of security connecting secure nodes located across a sea of insecurity in the global net.”

    Brian Snow, Former Technical Director of the US National Security Agency (NSA), "We need assurance!", 1999-2008

  • “Assurance is best addressed during the initial design and engineering of security systems, NOT as an after market patch. The earlier you include a security architect in your design process, the greater the likely hood of a successful and robust design. As the quip goes, he who gets to the (module) interface first wins.”

    Brian Snow, Former Technical Director of the US National Security Agency (NSA), "We need Assurance", AusCERT 2008

  • The software security industry today is at about the same stage as the auto industry was in 1930" ... "it looks fast, goes nice but in an accident you die.” ... "The major shortfall is absence of assurance (or safety) mechanisms in software. If my car crashed as often as my computer does, I would be dead by now."

    Brian Snow, Former Technical Director of the US National Security Agency (NSA), "We need assurance!", 1999-2008

  • “Given today’s common hardware and software architectural paradigms, operating systems security is a major primitive for secure systems – you will not succeed without it. This area is so important that it needs all the emphasis it can get. It is the current ‘black hole’ of security.”

    Brian Snow, Former Technical Director of the US National Security Agency (NSA), "We need assurance!", 1999-2008

  • "History has taught us: never underestimate the amount of money, time, and effort someone will expend to thwart a security system. It's always better to assume the worst. Assume your adversaries are better than they are. Assume science and technology will soon be able to do things they cannot yet. Give yourself a margin for error. Give yourself more security than you need today. When the unexpected happens, you'll be glad you did."

    Bruce Schneier, "Why Cryptography Is Harder Than It Looks", 1997
  • "Some physicists predicted that within the next 10 to 20 years quantum computers will be built that are sufficiently powerful to implement Shor’s ideas and to break all existing public key schemes. Thus we need to look ahead to a future of quantum computers, and we need to prepare the cryptographic world for that future.

    Prof Seth Lloyd of MIT, MIT Review 2008

  • “Business now relies on information infrastructures that are interlinked and interdependent… The way in which these hidden interdependencies pervade our everyday lives is staggering and, in some cases, may go unchecked for many years until an incident occurs that revels the true nature of the interdependences' impact.”

    The British Government’s Technology Strategy Board, 2008
  • “When will we be secure? Nobody knows for sure – but it cannot happen before commercial security products and services possess not only enough functionality to satisfy customers’ stated needs, but also sufficient assurance of quality, reliability, safety, and appropriateness for use. Such assurances are lacking in most of today’s commercial security products and services.”

    Brian Snow, Former Technical Director of the US National Security Agency (NSA), "We need Assurance", 2005

Resources Frequently asked questions Security in general faq: Is it possible that the exponential growth in conventional computing power may continue indefinitely?
faq: Is it possible that the exponential growth in conventional computing power may continue indefinitely?


Moore's law
describes an important trend in the history of computer hardware: that the number of transistors that can be inexpensively placed on an integrated circuit is increasing exponentially, doubling approximately every two years. The trend has continued for more than half a century and is not expected to stop for another decade at least and perhaps much longer.

Many publications recommending key lengths of cryptographic primitives take into account the historical rate of computational improvement which is based on Moore’s law to determine how long a key length might be secure [see here, here, and here].

This type of analysis attempts to extrapolate future performance from the past rate of development. This type of approach cannot take into account disruptive advances in science and technology. For example according to a press announcement “a team of Michigan Technological University researchers led by physicist Ranjit Pati have developed a model to explain the mechanism behind the single molecular switch, widely considered to be computing's Holy Grail. If worked out experimentally, the model could help explode Moore's Law and revolutionize computing technology.”

Another example is that it is not known at what time computers will have greater computational ability than humans – or alternatively at what time computer enhanced humans will significantly exceed our current intelligence levels. One or more abrupt advances in computing power may occur as a result of AI.

The situation is worse when we attempt to consider the interaction between Moore's law and quantum computers. Unfortunately it is not possible to project how fast quantum computing power might grow in the next year, five years or 20 years because, according to Prof. Scott Aaronson of MIT, “there is currently no analogue of Moore’s law for quantum computing”.  In theory the performance of some quantum computers could rapidly increase in a short period of time, particularly if the model can leverage the already mature semiconductor industry.

What is needed is a conservative method to address the issue of Moore's law, the anticipated arrival of code-breaking quantum computers, and the unknown rate of improvement of said computers.

Click here to read about Synaptic Labs' proposal to address these issues.

 

 
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image Introduction to synaptic Laboratories global cyber safety and Security status 2012 Cyber Security Technical Problems, Drivers and Incentives Video Presentation by Brian Snow

"Synaptic Laboratories is a rare company; they tackle the hard problems! Their basic approach is directly relevant to Governments and/or any commercial companies that deploy products that must function correctly in high-risk environments. They differ from most competitors in that not only do they work hard to get the concepts right, they also work very hard to assure the implementation is correct and robust as well."

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