“Build-in Security: Ensure that security is considered and built into the design of new infrastructure, so that our critical assets are protected from the start and more resilient to naturally-occurring and deliberate threats throughout their life-cycle."

Obama-Biden Plan, Agenda: Homeland Security, December 2008

“New concepts for quantum computer implementations, algorithms, and advances in the theoretical understanding of the physics requirements for quantum computers appear almost weekly in the scientific literature.”

ARDA, Report of the Quantum Information Science and Technology Experts Panel

“It's not good enough to have a system where everyone (using the system) must be trusted, it must also be made robust against insiders!”

Robert Morris, former Chief Scientist of the US National Security Agency (NSA), National Computer Security Center, "Crypto '95 invited talks by R. Morris and A. Shamir", 1995

Florence Luy asks the question: "Is the writing on the wall for 1024-bit (RSA) encryption?"
Dutch mathematician Hendrik Willem Lenstra: "The answer to that question is an unqualified yes."

Florence Luy, Hendrik Lenstra, “A mighty number falls”, 21 May 2007, École Polytechnicque Fédérale de Lausanne

"There is a good chance that large quantum computers can be built within the next 20 years.  This would be a nightmare for IT security if there are no fully developed, implemented, and standardized post-quantum signature schemes."

Prof. Johannes Buchmann, et al, “Post-Quantum Signatures”, Oct 2004, Technische Universität Darmstadt

"Many crypto-systems considered robust have been broken after a certain amount of time (between 10-20 years).  ... We need to build crypto-systems that offer long term security, for example for protecting financial and medical information (medical information such as our DNA may be sensitive information with impact on our children, our grandchildren and beyond)."

"Security and dependability issues typically go along with the life cycle of a technology.  The trend to first deploy a technology and later fix its problems – typically driven by economic motives – is gradually making way for security by design, resulting in improved security at the beginning of the life cycle."

“The software security industry today is at about the same stage as the auto industry was in 1930" ... "it looks fast, goes nice but in an accident you die.” ... "The major shortfall is absence of assurance (or safety) mechanisms in software. If my car crashed as often as my computer does, I would be dead by now."

Brian Snow, Former Technical Director of the US National Security Agency (NSA), "We need assurance!", 1999-2008

“The time needed to factor an RSA integer is the same order as the time needed to use that same integer as modulus for a single RSA encryption.   In other words, it takes no more time to break RSA on a quantum computer (up to a multiplicative constant) than to use it legitimately on a classical computer.”

Professor Gilles Brassard,  "Quantum Information Processing: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly", 1997

"One often hears recommendations for key-sizes of public-key cryptosystems needed to obtain security for 30 years and even 50 years. Anyone wanting a real security of this magnitude should probably take the construction of the quantum computer into consideration."

ECRYPT, “D.PROVI.3 – First Summary Report on Unconditionally Secure Protocols”, January 2005

“So the threat to cryptography is well understood due to work by Peter Shor and others. A symmetric algorithm like AES or others standard crypto processes is cut (of) key-size in half, which is a dramatic reduction. ... For key management purposes, against the RSA and the Diffie-Hellman and stuff, they flat-line under a quantum computer.”

Brian Snow, Former Technical Director of the US National Security Agency (NSA), Public Key Cryptography 30th Anniversary Conference, Dec 2006

"In the medium term, we need to be prepared for the eventuality that large quantum computers could be built: this would require an upgrade of most symmetric cryptographic algorithms and a completely new generation of public-key algorithms."

SecurIST, “D3.3 – ICT Security & Dependability Research beyond 2010: Final Strategy”, January 2007

“Consider the use of smart cards ... for especially critical functions.  Although more costly than software, when properly implemented the assurance gain is great.  The form-factor is not as important as the existence of an isolated processor and address space for assured operations – an ‘Island of Security,’ if you will.  Such devices can communicate with each other through secure protocols and provide a web of security connecting secure nodes located across a sea of insecurity in the global net.”

Brian Snow, Former Technical Director of the US National Security Agency (NSA), "We need assurance!", 1999-2008

“Briefly and simply, assurance work makes a user or a creditor more confident that the system works as intended without flaws, without surprises, even in the presence of malice.” … “The major shortfall is absence of assurance or safety mechanisms in software.  If my car crashed as often as my computer does, I’d be dead by now.”

Brian Snow, Former Technical Director of the US National Security Agency (NSA), "We need Assurance", AusCERT 2008

“In the next five years we will counter many 'hacker' attacks but we will not be safe from Nation States and other large entities”

Brian Snow, Former Technical Director of the US National Security Agency (NSA), "We need assurance!", 1999-2008

"Some physicists predicted that within the next 10 to 20 years quantum computers will be built that are sufficiently powerful to implement Shor’s ideas and to break all existing public key schemes. Thus we need to look ahead to a future of quantum computers, and we need to prepare the cryptographic world for that future.”

Prof Seth Lloyd of MIT, MIT Review 2008

“Assurance is best addressed during the initial design and engineering of security systems, NOT as an after market patch. The earlier you include a security architect in your design process, the greater the likely hood of a successful and robust design. As the quip goes, he who gets to the (module) interface first wins.”

Brian Snow, Former Technical Director of the US National Security Agency (NSA), "We need Assurance", AusCERT 2008