• “It's not good enough to have a system where everyone (using the system) must be trusted, it must also be made robust against insiders!”

    Robert Morris, former Chief Scientist of the US National Security Agency (NSA), National Computer Security Center, "Crypto '95 invited talks by R. Morris and A. Shamir", 1995

  • “Consider the use of smart cards ... for especially critical functions.  Although more costly than software, when properly implemented the assurance gain is great.  The form-factor is not as important as the existence of an isolated processor and address space for assured operations – an ‘Island of Security,’ if you will.  Such devices can communicate with each other through secure protocols and provide a web of security connecting secure nodes located across a sea of insecurity in the global net.”

    Brian Snow, Former Technical Director of the US National Security Agency (NSA), "We need assurance!", 1999-2008

  • "Some physicists predicted that within the next 10 to 20 years quantum computers will be built that are sufficiently powerful to implement Shor’s ideas and to break all existing public key schemes. Thus we need to look ahead to a future of quantum computers, and we need to prepare the cryptographic world for that future.

    Prof Seth Lloyd of MIT, MIT Review 2008

  • Build-in Security: Ensure that security is considered and built into the design of new infrastructure, so that our critical assets are protected from the start and more resilient to naturally-occurring and deliberate threats throughout their life-cycle."

    Obama-Biden Plan, Agenda: Homeland Security, December 2008

  • "My colleagues at MIT and I have been building simple quantum computers and executing quantum algorithms since 1996, as have other scientists around the world. Quantum computers work as promised. If they can be scaled up, to thousands or tens of thousands of qubits from their current size of a dozen or so, watch out!

    Prof Seth Lloyd of MIT, MIT Review 2008

  • “Never underestimate the attention, risk, money and time that an opponent will put into reading traffic.”

    Robert Morris, former Chief Scientist of the US National Security Agency (NSA), National Computer Security Center, "Crypto '95 invited talks by R. Morris and A. Shamir", 1995

  • "History has taught us: never underestimate the amount of money, time, and effort someone will expend to thwart a security system. It's always better to assume the worst. Assume your adversaries are better than they are. Assume science and technology will soon be able to do things they cannot yet. Give yourself a margin for error. Give yourself more security than you need today. When the unexpected happens, you'll be glad you did."

    Bruce Schneier, "Why Cryptography Is Harder Than It Looks", 1997
  • "First and foremost, there is no proper excuse for continued use of a broken cryptographic primitive (MD5) when sufficiently strong alternatives are readily available, for example SHA-2. Secondly, there is no substitute for security awareness." ... "Advice from experts should be taken seriously and early in the process. In this case, MD5 should have been phased out soon after 2004."

    Alexander Sotirov, Marc Stevens, Jacob Appelbaum, Arjen Lenstra, David Molnar, Dag Arne Osvik, Benne de Wegerr, "MD5 considered harmful today - Creating a rogue CA certificate", December 2008
  • “When will we be secure? Nobody knows for sure – but it cannot happen before commercial security products and services possess not only enough functionality to satisfy customers’ stated needs, but also sufficient assurance of quality, reliability, safety, and appropriateness for use. Such assurances are lacking in most of today’s commercial security products and services.”

    Brian Snow, Former Technical Director of the US National Security Agency (NSA), "We need Assurance", 2005

  • "The future ability of quantum computers might be a decade or two away, their future ability to break public-key cryptography has important implications for the encryption of highly sensitive information today. For these applications, we must already design new public-key cryptosystems and one-way functions that are immune to quantum cryptanalysis."

    ARDA, Report of the Quantum Information Science and Technology Experts Panel, 2004

  • "Today’s systems must anticipate future attacks. Any comprehensive system – whether for authenticated communications, secure data storage, or electronic commerce – is likely to remain in use for five years or more. It must be able to withstand the future: smarter attackers, more computational power, and greater incentives to subvert a widespread system. There won’t be time to upgrade it in the field."

    Bruce Schneier, "Why Cryptography Is Harder Than It Looks", 1997
  • “We are a cyber nation. The U.S. information infrastructure--including telecommunications and computer networks and systems and the data that reside on them--is critical to virtually every aspect of modern life. This information infrastructure is increasingly vulnerable to exploitation, disruption, and destruction by a growing array of adversaries.”

    The National Coordination Office (NCO) for Networking Information Technology Research and Development (NITRD), Federal Register: December 30, 2008 (Volume 73, Number 250).

  • "There is a good chance that large quantum computers can be built within the next 20 years.  This would be a nightmare for IT security if there are no fully developed, implemented, and standardized post-quantum signature schemes."

    Prof. Johannes Buchmann, et al, “Post-Quantum Signatures”, Oct 2004, Technische Universität Darmstadt

  • "But conventional security is not enough. The complexity of today's operational environment means organisations must embrace a level of business resilience that is normally associated with the protection of critical national infrastructure."

    Detica, a BAE Systems Company

Resources Expert Opinions Quantum computing

Quantum computing

This section quotes leading cryptographic and quantum computing experts on the timing, capabilities and impact of quantum computers on global security systems. These quotes are often longer and more detailed than the quotes that cycle on the right hand side of each page.

Title Filter     Display # 
# Article Title
1 quote: Johannes Buchmann, Jintai Ding, Building quantum computers since 1996
2 quote: Seth Lloyd, Building quantum computers since 1996
3 quote: ARDA, New concepts for QC appear almost weakly
4 quote: ARDA, Quantum computers is a rapidly evolving field
5 quote: ECRYPT, Breakthrough in quantum computation would spell doom
6 quote: Prof. Johannes Buchmann, Good chance large quantum computers in 20 years... This would be a nightmare for IT security if...
7 quote: Brian Snow, Public key crypto would essentially be flat-lined by quantum computing
8 quote: ECRYPT, 30 to 50 year security should take quantum computers into consideration
9 quote: ECRYPT, Recommendations made today should be assigned a rather small confidence level
10 quote: Seth Lloyd, Even a relatively small quantum computer could break all known codes
11 quote: Seth Lloyd, Given their power to intercept and disrupt
12 quote: Gilles Brasssard, Takes no more time to break RSA than to run it
13 quote: Brian Snow, Quantum computers flat-line RSA, D&H, and ...
14 quote: ARDA, Code breaking quantum computers may be a decade or two away
15 quote: SecurIST, We need to be prepared for large quantum computers
 
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