• “Assurance is best addressed during the initial design and engineering of security systems, NOT as an after market patch. The earlier you include a security architect in your design process, the greater the likely hood of a successful and robust design. As the quip goes, he who gets to the (module) interface first wins.”

    Brian Snow, Former Technical Director of the US National Security Agency (NSA), "We need Assurance", AusCERT 2008

  • “We are a cyber nation. The U.S. information infrastructure--including telecommunications and computer networks and systems and the data that reside on them--is critical to virtually every aspect of modern life. This information infrastructure is increasingly vulnerable to exploitation, disruption, and destruction by a growing array of adversaries.”

    The National Coordination Office (NCO) for Networking Information Technology Research and Development (NITRD), Federal Register: December 30, 2008 (Volume 73, Number 250).

  • "Given their power to intercept and disrupt secret communications, it is not surprising that quantum computers have the attention of various U.S. government agencies.  The National Security Agency, which supports research in quantum computing, candidly declares that given its interest in keeping U.S. government communications secure, it is loath to see quantum computers built. On the other hand, if they can be built, then it wants to have the first one.”

    Prof Seth Lloyd of MIT, MIT Review 2008

  • "First and foremost, there is no proper excuse for continued use of a broken cryptographic primitive (MD5) when sufficiently strong alternatives are readily available, for example SHA-2. Secondly, there is no substitute for security awareness." ... "Advice from experts should be taken seriously and early in the process. In this case, MD5 should have been phased out soon after 2004."

    Alexander Sotirov, Marc Stevens, Jacob Appelbaum, Arjen Lenstra, David Molnar, Dag Arne Osvik, Benne de Wegerr, "MD5 considered harmful today - Creating a rogue CA certificate", December 2008
  • "Some physicists predicted that within the next 10 to 20 years quantum computers will be built that are sufficiently powerful to implement Shor’s ideas and to break all existing public key schemes. Thus we need to look ahead to a future of quantum computers, and we need to prepare the cryptographic world for that future.

    Prof Seth Lloyd of MIT, MIT Review 2008

  • "History has taught us: never underestimate the amount of money, time, and effort someone will expend to thwart a security system. It's always better to assume the worst. Assume your adversaries are better than they are. Assume science and technology will soon be able to do things they cannot yet. Give yourself a margin for error. Give yourself more security than you need today. When the unexpected happens, you'll be glad you did."

    Bruce Schneier, "Why Cryptography Is Harder Than It Looks", 1997
  • Build-in Security: Ensure that security is considered and built into the design of new infrastructure, so that our critical assets are protected from the start and more resilient to naturally-occurring and deliberate threats throughout their life-cycle."

    Obama-Biden Plan, Agenda: Homeland Security, December 2008

  • “The time needed to factor an RSA integer is the same order as the time needed to use that same integer as modulus for a single RSA encryption.   In other words, it takes no more time to break RSA on a quantum computer (up to a multiplicative constant) than to use it legitimately on a classical computer.”

    Professor Gilles Brassard,  "Quantum Information Processing: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly", 1997

  • “Given today’s common hardware and software architectural paradigms, operating systems security is a major primitive for secure systems – you will not succeed without it. This area is so important that it needs all the emphasis it can get. It is the current ‘black hole’ of security.”

    Brian Snow, Former Technical Director of the US National Security Agency (NSA), "We need assurance!", 1999-2008

  • “Briefly and simply, assurance work makes a user or a creditor more confident that the system works as intended without flaws, without surprises, even in the presence of malice.” … “The major shortfall is absence of assurance or safety mechanisms in software.  If my car crashed as often as my computer does, I’d be dead by now.”

    Brian Snow, Former Technical Director of the US National Security Agency (NSA), "We need Assurance", AusCERT 2008

  • “The more complex the threats become, the more you have to do the basics and groundwork really well. Staying aware and on top of new vulnerabilities and ensuring that patches and software updates are rapidly implemented is crucial.”

    Jeff Shipley, Cisco Intelligence Collection Manager, Cisco 2008 Annual Security Report

  • "But conventional security is not enough. The complexity of today's operational environment means organisations must embrace a level of business resilience that is normally associated with the protection of critical national infrastructure."

    Detica, a BAE Systems Company

Resources Expert Opinions Quantum computing

Quantum computing

This section quotes leading cryptographic and quantum computing experts on the timing, capabilities and impact of quantum computers on global security systems. These quotes are often longer and more detailed than the quotes that cycle on the right hand side of each page.

Title Filter     Display # 
# Article Title
1 quote: Johannes Buchmann, Jintai Ding, Building quantum computers since 1996
2 quote: Seth Lloyd, Building quantum computers since 1996
3 quote: ARDA, New concepts for QC appear almost weakly
4 quote: ARDA, Quantum computers is a rapidly evolving field
5 quote: ECRYPT, Breakthrough in quantum computation would spell doom
6 quote: Prof. Johannes Buchmann, Good chance large quantum computers in 20 years... This would be a nightmare for IT security if...
7 quote: Brian Snow, Public key crypto would essentially be flat-lined by quantum computing
8 quote: ECRYPT, 30 to 50 year security should take quantum computers into consideration
9 quote: ECRYPT, Recommendations made today should be assigned a rather small confidence level
10 quote: Seth Lloyd, Even a relatively small quantum computer could break all known codes
11 quote: Seth Lloyd, Given their power to intercept and disrupt
12 quote: Gilles Brasssard, Takes no more time to break RSA than to run it
13 quote: Brian Snow, Quantum computers flat-line RSA, D&H, and ...
14 quote: ARDA, Code breaking quantum computers may be a decade or two away
15 quote: SecurIST, We need to be prepared for large quantum computers
 
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