"In the medium term, we need to be prepared for the eventuality that large quantum computers could be built: this would require an upgrade of most symmetric cryptographic algorithms and a completely new generation of public-key algorithms."

SecurIST, “D3.3 – ICT Security & Dependability Research beyond 2010: Final Strategy”, January 2007

"Even a relatively small quantum computer, one that had a few tens of thousands of qubits, could consider so many different values at once that it would be able to break all known [ed: RSA, D&H, ECC, AES-128] codes commonly used for secure Internet communication.”

Prof Seth Lloyd of MIT, MIT Review 2008

“Advances have often been done in steps, and beyond approximately 10 years into the future, the general feeling among ECRYPT partners is that recommendations made today should be assigned a rather small confidence level, perhaps in particular for asymmetric primitives.”

European ECRYPT Network of Excellence, “Yearly Report on Algorithms and Key Lengths (2007-2008)", 2008

"But conventional security is not enough. The complexity of today's operational environment means organisations must embrace a level of business resilience that is normally associated with the protection of critical national infrastructure."

Detica, a BAE Systems Company

Public key crypto key exchanges (RSA, D&H, ECC) would be ‘flat-lined’ under a quantum computer attack … "Open Problem”

Brian Snow, Former Technical Director of the US National Security Agency (NSA), Public Key Cryptography 30th Anniversary Conference, Dec 2006

“Briefly and simply, assurance work makes a user or a creditor more confident that the system works as intended without flaws, without surprises, even in the presence of malice.” … “The major shortfall is absence of assurance or safety mechanisms in software.  If my car crashed as often as my computer does, I’d be dead by now.”

Brian Snow, Former Technical Director of the US National Security Agency (NSA), "We need Assurance", AusCERT 2008

“The rapidly evolving field of quantum computers is one of the most active research areas of modern science, attracting substantial funding that supports research groups at internationally leading academic institutions, national laboratories, and major industrial-research centers.”

ARDA, Report of the Quantum Information Science and Technology Experts Panel, 2004

"One should not assume that stakeholders do not care about their security merely because they do not understand the consequences of certain actions. The perception of risk can vary significantly from actual risk and, in the short term, convenience may lead some early adopters to make hazardous decisions."

“Build-in Security: Ensure that security is considered and built into the design of new infrastructure, so that our critical assets are protected from the start and more resilient to naturally-occurring and deliberate threats throughout their life-cycle."

Obama-Biden Plan, Agenda: Homeland Security, December 2008

“The software security industry today is at about the same stage as the auto industry was in 1930" ... "it looks fast, goes nice but in an accident you die.” ... "The major shortfall is absence of assurance (or safety) mechanisms in software. If my car crashed as often as my computer does, I would be dead by now."

Brian Snow, Former Technical Director of the US National Security Agency (NSA), "We need assurance!", 1999-2008

"There is a good chance that large quantum computers can be built within the next 20 years.  This would be a nightmare for IT security if there are no fully developed, implemented, and standardized post-quantum signature schemes."

Prof. Johannes Buchmann, et al, “Post-Quantum Signatures”, Oct 2004, Technische Universität Darmstadt

"One often hears recommendations for key-sizes of public-key cryptosystems needed to obtain security for 30 years and even 50 years. Anyone wanting a real security of this magnitude should probably take the construction of the quantum computer into consideration."

ECRYPT, “D.PROVI.3 – First Summary Report on Unconditionally Secure Protocols”, January 2005

"The future ability of quantum computers might be a decade or two away, their future ability to break public-key cryptography has important implications for the encryption of highly sensitive information today. For these applications, we must already design new public-key cryptosystems and one-way functions that are immune to quantum cryptanalysis."

ARDA, Report of the Quantum Information Science and Technology Experts Panel, 2004

"Many applications stay in use for much longer than anticipated, but during the extended lifetime they will be functioning in an environment for which they have not been designed, resulting in completely new vulnerabilities and risks."

"Given their power to intercept and disrupt secret communications, it is not surprising that quantum computers have the attention of various U.S. government agencies.  The National Security Agency, which supports research in quantum computing, candidly declares that given its interest in keeping U.S. government communications secure, it is loath to see quantum computers built. On the other hand, if they can be built, then it wants to have the first one.”

Prof Seth Lloyd of MIT, MIT Review 2008

Florence Luy asks the question: "Is the writing on the wall for 1024-bit (RSA) encryption?"
Dutch mathematician Hendrik Willem Lenstra: "The answer to that question is an unqualified yes."

Florence Luy, Hendrik Lenstra, “A mighty number falls”, 21 May 2007, École Polytechnicque Fédérale de Lausanne

“The time needed to factor an RSA integer is the same order as the time needed to use that same integer as modulus for a single RSA encryption.   In other words, it takes no more time to break RSA on a quantum computer (up to a multiplicative constant) than to use it legitimately on a classical computer.”

Professor Gilles Brassard,  "Quantum Information Processing: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly", 1997