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“Assurance is best addressed during the initial design and engineering of security systems, NOT as an after market patch. The earlier you include a security architect in your design process, the greater the likely hood of a successful and robust design. As the quip goes, he who gets to the (module) interface first wins.”
Brian Snow, Former Technical Director of the US National Security Agency (NSA), "We need Assurance", AusCERT 2008 -
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“It's not good enough to have a system where everyone (using the system) must be trusted, it must also be made robust against insiders!”
Robert Morris, former Chief Scientist of the US National Security Agency (NSA), National Computer Security Center, "Crypto '95 invited talks by R. Morris and A. Shamir", 1995
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"Many crypto-systems considered robust have been broken after a certain amount of time (between 10-20 years). ... We need to build crypto-systems that offer long term security, for example for protecting financial and medical information (medical information such as our DNA may be sensitive information with impact on our children, our grandchildren and beyond)."
SecurIST, “D3.3 – ICT Security & Dependability Research beyond 2010: Final Strategy”, January 2007
| fact: TOP SECRET classified international traffic known to be at risk due to use of ECC by international standards |
| Synaptic Facts and FAQs - Security in general |
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The Cryptographic Modernization Program (started in 1999) is a United States Department of Defense directed, NSA Information Assurance Directorate led effort to transform and modernize Information Assurance capabilities for the 21st century. It has three phases:
All command and control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, information technology and weapons systems that rely upon cryptography for the provision of assured confidentiality, integrity, and authentication services will become a part of this long-term undertaking. The Cryptographic Modernization program is a tightly integrated partnership between the NSA, the military departments, operational commands, defense agencies, the Joint Staff, federal government entities and industry. As part of the Cryptographic Modernization Program the NSA has specified two suites of cryptographic algorithms, Suite A and Suite B. Suite A contains classified algorithms that will not be released. Suite B is a set of openly published cryptographic algorithms. The choice of two suites of algorithm allows for protection of sensitive government data (using Suite A) as well as interoperability with coalition partners (using Suite B), such as NATO. (sourced from webpages displayed at "Military Information Technology" which are no longer online). Most modernized devices will include both Suite A (US only) and Suite B support. The capabilities of Suite A are not openly published and so it is not possible to determine if this suite has been explicitly designed to protect against code-breaking quantum computers. Suite B recommends the use of AES-128 and AES-256, ECC for key exchanges, ECC for digital signatures and SHA-256 and SHA-384 for hash functions. AES-128 and ECC are known to be vulnerable to quantum computing attacks. We quote the following announcement by NSA on the use of ECC:
The US National Security Agency, "The Case for Elliptic Curve Cryptography", October 2005
Today the international community has the potential to protect the at risk ECC key exchange operations with Synaptic Labs' range of key exchange technologies and protect ECC for digital signatures using modern schemes based on the pioneering work of Lamport-Diffie-Merkle using the AES-256 and SHA-384 post quantum secure operations present in the NSA suite B. Synaptic technologies can rapidly upgrade systems that use ECC as a first step while the global comunity considers what solution to standardise on for the replacement of ECC / RSA.
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| Last Updated on Friday, 16 January 2009 13:24 |
